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I. INTRODUCTION 
Alexander Boni-Saenz’s most recent article, Sexuality and Incapacity, 
challenges the normative foundations of legal incapacity doctrines in the 
context of sexual decision-making of older adults with cognitive disabilities.1 
                                                                                                                     
 * Acting Professor of Law and Martin Luther King Jr. Hall Research Scholar, U.C. 
Davis School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School; A.B., Dartmouth College. Many thanks to 
Dean Kevin R. Johnson and Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs Madhavi Sunder 
for their institutional support; to Dean Kevin R. Johnson and Robert D. Dinerstein for their 
helpful comments; to Wynter K. Miller for her excellent research assistance; and to the 
OSLJ editors. 
 1 See generally Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1201 (2015). I use the term “older adults” in line with the movement away from “elderly” 
and other terms that signify the frailty of this population. See, e.g., Times Have Changed; 
What Should We Call ‘Old People’? , NPR (Feb. 6, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=465819152 
[https://perma.cc/8FFX-P6TL] (discussing the least disliked descriptor for a person over 
sixty-five years old and declaring “older adults” as the winner). 
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Sexuality and Incapacity reimagines the foundations of legal incapacity 
doctrine in the context of sexual assault. Boni-Saenz is guided by principles of 
Martha Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach” to human development2 and the 
nascent theory and practice of supported decision-making (SDM), which is “a 
series of relationships, practices, arrangements, and agreements, of more or 
less formality and intensity, designed to assist an individual with a disability to 
make and communicate to others decisions about the individual’s life.”3 This 
normative shift more accurately reflects the consultative, relational manner in 
which almost all people (those with and without disabilities) make decisions—
with support from trusted friends, advisors, and family members.  
Boni-Saenz constructs a three-step functional test for legal capacity—what 
he calls “cognition-plus.” The test has two relatively familiar components and 
a third novel addition: (1) a threshold question of volition (can the person 
express a preference free from coercion?); (2) a question of understanding 
(does the person possess the cognitive capabilities to understand the nature and 
consequences of a sexual decision?); and (3) a question of the existence of an 
“adequate” support network.4 A person who lacks the cognitive capabilities 
identified in (2) may still be found legally capable if an “adequate” network of 
trusted supporters exists who can facilitate sexual decision-making.5 
Cognition-plus offers administrable elements to address concerns about 
expansive judicial discretion under a test previously advanced by Deborah 
Denno, known as the “contextual approach.”6 
                                                                                                                     
 2 Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 
279–85 (1997); see also Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development 
Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2877–78 (2006) (applying Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach to intellectual property globalization); William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global 
Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
581, 639–44 (2007) (citing Nussbaum’s capabilities approach in support of recognizing a 
human right to health); Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1922–26 (2001) (applying Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to 
argue for state protection against private violence and a right to provide care to 
dependents). 
 3 Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road From 
Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 10 (2012). Such 
contractual options allow a person to indicate will and preferences in advance of a time of 
diminished capacity and perhaps prevent the need for a future, formal court determination 
of incapacity. 
 4 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1234–36.  
 5 Id. at 1236.  
 6 Compare Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 315, 355–57 (1997) (outlining her “contextual approach” for legal capacity 
that “focusses on the situational context and particular circumstances of each case” along 
with current research), with Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1221 (noting that Denno’s “open-
ended flight to context” may create more uncertainty as it “widens the factual inquiry by 
the court”), and Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, Social Science 
Evidence, and Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 60–61 (1998) (arguing for a 
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The addition of SDM as an alternative means of demonstrating legal 
capacity expands the possibilities for greater sexual access for people with 
cognitive disabilities. The use of SDM challenges existing sociopolitical 
beliefs in autonomous decision-making as the ideal.7 It shifts the analysis of 
legal incapacity from a focus on individual cognitive deficiencies to an 
examination of the sufficiency of external supports and resources available to 
the individual.8 In cases of cognitive impairment, the lack of external support 
itself generates legal incapacity. Boni-Saenz’s discussion of “sexual 
capability” rebrands sex as a positive good;9 as a result, inclusion requires that 
people with cognitive disabilities be considered part of a broader sexual 
minority.10 
This Response analyzes three aspects of Boni-Saenz’s cognition-plus test. 
First, I position his normative and prescriptive proposals within an existing, 
robust conversation regarding legal capacity, SDM, and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Scholars of 
international human rights law offer valuable insights on challenges of 
redefining legal capacity and implementing SDM. Advocates continue to 
                                                                                                                     
narrower test because expanding the contextual frame of criminal law often “perpetuates 
stereotypes that subordinate entire groups”). Denno focuses on cases where persons with 
intellectual or developmental disabilities were victims of sexual assault. Denno, supra, at 
315. 
 7 Jonathan Herring, Entering the Fog: On the Borderlines of Mental Capacity, 83 
IND. L.J. 1619, 1620 (2008) (“For those who possess legal capacity, the cardinal principle 
is the right of self-determination or autonomy.”); see also Nancy J. Knauer, Defining 
Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests of Autonomy and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & 
C.R. L. REV. 321, 325 (2003) (arguing that the American legal system implicitly endorses 
“abstract principles of autonomy”). The fact that diverse areas of the law assign liability for 
activities undertaken without the requisite consent also suggests a broad normative 
judgment in favor of individual autonomy. See id. at 322–23 & nn.2–14 (noting a capacity 
requirement in a variety of contexts, ranging from medical treatment to marriage and 
divorce to jury duty). 
 8 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1230–32.  
 9 See id. at 1224–25. 
 10 See Herring, supra note 7, at 1625 (noting that “while notions of competence 
purport to be neutral, these notions in fact reflect majority interests and values” such that 
“[w]omen and ethnic minorities remain particularly vulnerable to assessments that they 
lack mental capacity”); Shelia Jennings, Reflections on Personhood: Girls with Severe 
Disabilities and the Law, 2 CANADIAN J. DISABILITY STUD. 55, 58 (2013) (“[P]atriarchy 
and racism have denied legal personhood to certain individuals and groups.”); see also KIM 
E. NIELSEN, A DISABILITY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, at xii (2012) (“African 
Americans, immigrants, gays and lesbians, poor people, and women have been defined 
categorically as defective citizens incapable of full civic participation.”). For further 
discussion of A Disability History of the United States, see Alison M. Parker, Intersecting 
Histories of Gender, Race, and Disability, 27 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 178, 178–79 (2015) 
(reviewing NIELSEN, supra, and agreeing that “what people perceive to be ‘disabilities’ 
changes over time and is socially constructed”). 
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debate and contest SDM as a practical, administrable, and measurable 
alternative.11  
Second, I identify potential normative implications of incorporating SDM 
into domestic law, specifically for procedural and evidentiary law. Third, 
Boni-Saenz applies his test to the case of older adults with dementia in State v. 
Rayhons.12 I question a comparable application of cognition-plus to people 
with more severe intellectual and developmental disabilities (ID/DD) who are 
currently precluded from exercising sexual agency but may have the mental 
capability to do so.13 Boni-Saenz’s taxonomy of cognitive disabilities uses the 
onset of incapacity to distinguish “persistent acquired incapacity” from 
“persistent lifelong incapacity.”14 In his article, the former group is older 
adults while the latter have experienced intellectual and developmental 
disabilities since birth or early childhood, with no prior period of unimpaired 
cognitive functioning.15 This distinction matters with respect to assessing 
sexual decisions. I offer a number of factors unique to persons with ID/DD for 
Boni-Saenz to consider as he further develops cognition-plus.  
II. SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING IN CONTEXT 
SDM represents a significant departure from existing proxy decision-
making practices.16 Although Boni-Saenz relies on SDM in his proposed 
doctrinal model, his discussion of SDM’s evolution in international human 
rights law is underemphasized, particularly in light of the expanding literature 
in this area. This Part situates Boni-Saenz’s analysis within existing 
conversations regarding universal legal capacity pursuant to the CRPD.  
A. The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
From Substitute Decisions to Decisional Support 
Human rights scholar, Amita Dhanda, describes three dominant 
constructions of legal capacity: a status attribution test, a functional test, and 
an outcome test.17 Status attribution equates the presence of disability 
                                                                                                                     
 11 See, e.g., Peter Bartlett, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities and the Future of Mental Health Law, 8 PSYCHIATRY 496, 497–98 (2009) 
(presenting a more skeptical view of the future of SDM in the United Kingdom). 
 12 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1249–53. 
 13 See generally Jasmine E. Harris, The Dignity of Sexual Agency: Regulating Risk 
and Mental Disability (Sept. 12, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
 14 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1212–13. 
 15 Id. at 1212. 
 16 Dinerstein, supra note 3, at 8 (“[T]his use of the word ‘support,’ and the related 
concept of supported decision making, represents nothing less than a ‘paradigm shift’ away 
from well-established but increasingly discredited notions of substituted decision making.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 17 Amita Dhanda, Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of 
the Past or Lodestar for the Future?, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 429, 431–32 (2007); 
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(physical, mental, intellectual, or psychosocial) with a presumption of legal 
incapacity.18 Under a functional test, the presence of disability does not 
necessarily result in a finding of legal incapacity; rather, the person is deemed 
incapable if, because of her disability, she cannot perform a specific task or 
make a specific decision.19 The outcome test uses a socially disfavored 
outcome or decision as evidence that the person with a disability is incapable 
of rational decision-making.20 Dhanda argues that all three operate “in 
principle or in practice” as status attribution tests, and rely primarily on 
forensic psychologists to evaluate individuals’ (in)ability to reason using 
standardized assessments such as IQ scores.21 
The assessments Dhanda lays out favor risk aversion over decisional 
agency and, as a result, restrict people with cognitive disabilities in a way that 
constrains their human rights.22 Reform efforts have focused on increasing due 
process protections and the reliability of assessment tools in adjudicating legal 
capacity but generally do not challenge the normative baseline and 
assumptions, at least not in the United States.23 The functional test has become 
the modern standard and first emerged during the late twentieth century.24  
In practice, the functional test conflates legal capacity with mental 
capacity. Legal personhood (defined in the CRPD as “legal capacity”) 
recognizes an individual’s right to utilize courts and adjudicatory institutions 
as a means of protecting or exercising rights and responsibilities.25 In this 
sense, legal personhood resembles legal standing. Alternatively, mental 
capacity is narrower, functional, and asks the question whether the person has 
                                                                                                                     
see also Comm. on the Rights of Perss. with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1 (2014), 
Article 12: Equal Recognition Before the Law, para. 15, at 4, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1 
(Apr. 2014) [hereinafter General Comment No. 1] (discussing the three types of legal tests 
for capacity). 
 18 Dhanda, supra note 17, at 431. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 431–32. 
 21 Id. at 433. 
 22 See id. 
 23 Id. at 433–35; see also István Hoffman & György Könczei, Legal Regulations 
Relating to the Passive and Active Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual and 
Psychosocial Disabilities in Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and the Impending Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 143, 158 (2010) (noting that in the United States and other Western nations, 
legal systems emphasized bans on discrimination and focused on ensuring equal 
opportunities versus challenging baseline constructions of capacity); cf. E. Lea Johnston, 
Representational Competence: Defining the Limits of the Right to Self-Representation at 
Trial, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 527 n.26, 531 n.55, 583 n.341 (2011) (discussing case 
law in the context of self-representation and noting that courts rely on the Due Process 
Clause for representation determination decisions).  
 24 Eilionóir Flynn & Anna Arstein-Kerslake, The Support Model of Legal Capacity: 
Fact, Fiction, or Fantasy?, 32 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 124, 127 (2014). 
 25 See G.A. Res. 61/106, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 
12 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD]. 
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the cognitive ability to understand and appreciate a decision—e.g., marital, 
sexual, financial, medical.26 Legal capacity, then, should vary according to the 
nature of the decision and the gravity of the potential consequences.27  
The CRPD reflects a significant paradigm shift away from the functional 
test to a full recognition of universal legal capacity.28 A central debate among 
international human rights scholars concerns the meaning and scope of 
Article 12 and SDM, specifically, whether legal capacity includes both the 
capacity for rights (passive possession of the right) as well as the capacity to 
act (active, meaningful exercise of the right).29 During the treaty deliberation 
process, this distinction inspired much debate and contestation among state 
parties.30 Generally, state actors agreed that people with disabilities should 
have rights to legal personhood, but diverged with respect to whether the law 
would and should recognize an individual’s capacity to act when and if he or 
she could not do so independently without support. Permitting a person who 
lacks the mental capacity to make a decision and act upon it to retain that right 
instead of designating a substituted decision-maker challenged deeply rooted 
conceptions of choice and agency. As Amita Dhanda explained, there are two 
models: 
One recognizes that all persons have legal capacity and the other 
contends that legal capacity is not a human attribute. . . . [T]he first 
choice does not mean that it is also being contended that all human 
beings in fact possess similar capacities. Even as all human beings are 
being accorded similar value, the differences between them [are] not 
being ignored or devalued. The second, on the other hand, recognizes 
the fact that there are some human beings who do not possess legal 
capacity and hence can be declared incompetent. One system is 
                                                                                                                     
 26 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1209–10. 
 27 See generally CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE 
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 186–88 (2006) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), and noting that 
competency varies according to the special decision and the stakes; for example, a criminal 
defendant’s competence to plead guilty varies from that required to participate in his 
representation and trial); Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to 
Consent to Treatment, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED., 1834, 1836 (2007) (describing the “sliding 
scale” concept of legal capacity as reflective of its functional nature). 
 28 CRPD, supra note 25, art. 12 (“State Parties shall recognize that persons with 
disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.”). 
 29 See, e.g., Dhanda, supra note 17, at 452–56; Dinerstein, supra note 3, at 8–9 
(noting that the footnote in Article 12 of the CRPD differentiating between the two was 
ultimately excluded from the final text but that the deliberation and drafting process was 
nonetheless significant). 
 30 See Dhanda, supra note 17, at 438–56 (discussing the sequence of drafts that 
emerged as reflective of conflicting views regarding how to define legal capacity and what 
responsibility state parties would have for providing individual decision-making support). 
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premised on the universal presence of competence; the other on the 
selective presence of competence. 
 
 . . . . 
 
With the recognition of universal capacity, there is . . . . a claim of 
equality of opportunity but difference of treatment . . . .31 
The latter “exclusionary model” of legal capacity segregates those with 
significant mental disabilities, for whom the current standard of legal capacity 
is unattainable.32 
Dhanda’s clarification that a shift to universal legal capacity does not 
mean that everyone has the same set of capabilities (and, consequently, the 
level of support for decisional agency will vary according to the capabilities an 
individual does possess and the decision at hand) represents a crucial 
distinction. Legal capacity is better understood as a continuum of capabilities 
and a cross-sectional axis of different types of decisions or conduct. The 
provision of decision-making supports or accommodations depends on the 
intersection of the two axes.  
The CRPD model accounts for even the most severely disabled person 
who may require full support from a third party; however, two things 
distinguish it from the current functional approach using substituted decision-
making systems such as guardianship. First, the principle of universal legal 
capacity recognizes a person with severe disabilities as a legal person with 
rights, responsibilities, and recourse.33 Second, it preserves the person’s 
central role in the decision-making process, calling on the third party to make 
her best approximation of the will and preferences of the person with a 
cognitive disability based on actual knowledge about the person, prior 
interactions, and the existence of an ongoing relationship.34 
                                                                                                                     
 31 Id. at 457–58 (emphasis added).  
 32 See id. at 460. 
 33 CRPD, supra note 25, art. 12. 
 34 General Comment No. 1, supra note 17, para. 21, at 5 (“Where, after significant 
efforts have been made, it is not practicable to determine the will and preferences of an 
individual, the ‘best interpretation of will and preferences’ must replace the ‘best interests’ 
determinations. This respects the rights, will and preferences of the individual, in 
accordance with article 12, paragraph 4. The ‘best interests’ principle is not a safeguard 
which complies with article 12 in relation to adults. The ‘will and preferences’ paradigm 
must replace the ‘best interests’ paradigm to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy the 
right to legal capacity on an equal basis with others.”); see also Canadian Ass’n for Cmty. 
Living, Response to Draft General Comment No. 1 on Article 12, U.N. Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, at 5 (Feb. 26, 2014), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/GC/CanadianAssociationCommunityLiving_
Ar12.doc [https://perma.cc/ZN5R-ZLE3] (“In recognizing the reality of such situations, we 
recommend that GC advance the notion of ‘best interpretation of will and preference’ to 
replace the best interest test for application in these situations. Such a test would recognize 
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The terms of the CRPD do not formally apply to the United States at this 
time, owing to the fact that the U.S. Senate has twice failed to ratify the treaty, 
although the country is a signatory to it.35 Boni-Saenz—like international legal 
scholar Amita Dhanda36—recommends a normative shift to a notion of sexual 
capabilities, rooted in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen’s theory of “human 
capabilities.”37 While this proposal reflects a shift in theory in line with 
international human rights norms, Boni-Saenz’s approach does not recognize 
universal legal capacity. Reliance on a model of exclusion means that some 
cadre will still be stripped of legal personhood if, for example, they cannot 
pass the threshold requirement of expressing volition verbally or through 
conduct. Boni-Saenz’s approach reflects an interim compromise, adding depth 
to the functional test and drawing attention to the benefits of SDM without 
going as far as the CRPD.  
The “stickiness”38 of norms of substitute decision-making should not be 
underestimated and are intimately connected with the historical invisibility of 
                                                                                                                     
that will and preference cannot always be interpreted with certainty, but that there are 
always better interpretations than others.”). 
 35 Strong opposition to the CRPD’s ratification has come from conservative groups, 
such as the Heritage Foundation and the Family Research Council, who argue that the 
CRPD challenges U.S. sovereignty, as well as strips parents of children with disabilities of 
their decisional authority and gives it to state authorities. Josh Rogin, Senate GOP Rejects 
U.N. Disabilities Treaty, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 4, 2012), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/12/04/senate-gop-rejects-u-n-disabilities-treaty 
[https://perma.cc/8NW9-GNXG]; see also Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Sen. 
Robert J. Dole), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Senator_Dole_Testimony.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4KJS-V5SA] (noting that the treaty fell just five votes short of passage the 
previous year because “treaty opponents expressed concern that the CRPD would diminish 
American sovereignty”); id. (statement of the Hon. Tom Ridge, Chairman, National 
Organization on Disability), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Ridge_ 
Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YBE-LT5N] (voicing disappointment “following last 
year’s failure to ratify the treaty” and pleasure at revisiting the issue).  
 36 Dhanda, supra note 17, at 435–38 (describing a “capabilities” approach and the 
utility of this normative approach to legal incapacity). 
 37 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1223–33; accord Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 275–77 
(describing the development of the “capabilities approach” and distinguishing it from 
Amartya Sen’s approach).  
 38 Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 609 (2000) (explaining the failure of overly harsh legal sanctions, 
or “hard shoves,” as means to shift social norms in contrast to “gentle nudges” designed to 
delicately prod social norms in the direction of change); see also Richard H. McAdams, 
Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1992) (distinguishing individual absolute 
preferences from individual relative preferences, i.e., those preferences influenced by the 
preferences of “others,” in the context of market consumption); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Choosing Not to Choose, 64 DUKE L.J. 1, 10–11 (2014) (discussing the difficulties inherent 
in active choice models versus substituted decision-making and other default rules); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929 (1996) (noting 
that “social norms can make people act and talk publicly in ways that are different from 
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people with intellectual and developmental disabilities.39 Scholars have called 
for the use of SDM networks (both formal and informal) as viable alternatives 
to legal determinations of incapacity and appointment of surrogate decision-
makers through vehicles such as guardianship and conservatorship.40 
Article 12 of the CRPD makes the shift to universal legal capacity in four 
steps: (1) a formal declaration of the right of people with disabilities to 
universal legal capacity; (2) a legal mandate that state parties “recognize that 
persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in 
all aspects of life;” (3) a second requirement that states take affirmative, 
“appropriate measures to provide access . . . to the support [needed to] 
exercis[e] . . . legal capacity;” and (4) due process safeguards to protect against 
abuse.41 State disagreement regarding the proper scope of Article 12 reflected 
significant confusion over the meaning of legal capacity and its deserved 
recipients. To make this paradigm shift, a state must explicitly recognize the 
right to and exercise of legal capacity irrespective of the degree of support one 
might need to do so. The CRPD, therefore, is “not just a legal document, but 
also a political document, and as such, its message on the legal capacity of an 
excluded community should be unequivocal and forward looking.”42  
The principle law reform efforts and experiences with SDM occur in other 
countries, such as Canada, Ireland, Sweden, India, and others.43 A total of five 
provinces in Canada now use SDM systems, such as legally enforceable 
“representation agreements,” as effective contractual alternatives to 
                                                                                                                     
how they actually think” and that “[p]eople often act in accordance with norms that they 
wish were otherwise or even despise”).  
 39 See Jasmine E. Harris, Processing Disability, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 468–72 
(2015) (discussing the historical roots of current normative presumptions of incapacity 
associated with people with mental disabilities). 
 40 See generally Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted 
Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 157 (2010) (“[I]t would be preferable to 
support decision making rather than supplant it through guardianship”). 
 41 CRPD, supra note 25, art. 12. 
 42 Dhanda, supra note 17, at 447–48. Much of the international debate today turns on 
the timing of the implementation of the CRPD’s move to universal legal capacity. Some 
states contend that the move to universality must occur over time and requires normative 
shifts to take shape, and guardianship as an institution will continue to operate, albeit on a 
limited basis; other advocates call for the prompt deconstruction of guardianship entirely as 
a form of substituted decision-making. See, e.g., Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: 
Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity, Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 93, 146–47 (2012) (discussing British Columbia’s move towards SDM by use of 
“representation agreements”). 
 43 See, e.g., Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake, supra note 24, at 133–37 (discussing reforms 
of legal capacity statutes and doctrine in Ireland, Canada, and India); see also Robert D. 
Dinerstein et al., Emerging International Trends and Practices in Guardianship Law for 
People with Disabilities, 22 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 435, 436 (2016) (exploring “the 
recent history of guardianship in international law”).  
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guardianship.44 On March 16, 2016, the Israeli Knesset passed an amendment 
to the existing Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law adding a provision for 
SDM as the least restrictive means to decisional agency.45 Furthermore, the 
Bulgarian National Assembly soon will decide the fate of the Natural Persons 
and Support Measures Bill, designed to abolish guardianship and bring 
Bulgaria in line with the CRPD.46 Domestically, Texas is the first state to 
statutorily recognize SDM agreements as legitimate alternatives to 
guardianship.47  
Although the United States has yet to see a domestic judicial decision 
based solely on the principles of Article 12 of the CRPD or SDM,48 at least 
                                                                                                                     
 44 KRISTA JAMES & LAUREN WATTS, LAW COMM’N OF ONT., UNDERSTANDING THE 
LIVED EXPERIENCES OF SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA 4 (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.lco-cdo.org/capacity-guardianship-commissioned-paper-ccel.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DN22-JTCS] (listing British Columbia, Yukon, Alberta, Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan as provinces with experience using SDM); see also MICHAEL BACH & LANA 
KERZNER, LAW COMM’N OF ONT., A NEW PARADIGM FOR PROTECTING AUTONOMY AND 
THE RIGHT TO LEGAL CAPACITY 53 (Oct. 2010), http://www.lco-cdo.org/disabilities-
commissioned-paper-bach-kerzner.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQG2-LPCB] (“British Columbia’s 
Representation Agreement Act has been hailed by the disability community as highly 
successful legislative recognition of supported decision-making.” (emphasis omitted)); 
LANA KERZNER, PAVING THE WAY TO FULL REALIZATION OF THE CRPD’S RIGHTS TO 
LEGAL CAPACITY AND SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 37 (Apr. 
2011), http://supporteddecisionmaking.org/sites/default/files/paving_the_way_for_crpd_canada.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3BLY-LCWA] (describing the purposes of the Representation Agreement 
Act).  
 45 Capacity and Guardianship (Amendment No. 18) Law, 5776-2016, § 67B (Mar. 16, 
2016), translated in http://bizchut.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/new-Israeli-law-
on-supported-decision-making.docx [https://perma.cc/X7DP-F6NE] (adding section 67B 
defining a decision-making supporter, limiting her role and duties, and establishing the 
“express interest” standard as the guiding principle of SDM). 
 46 Oliver Lewis, Why Should Bulgaria Change Its Guardianship System?, OLIVER 
TALKS (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.mdac.info/en/olivertalks/2016/03/14/why-should-
bulgaria-change-its-guardianship-system [https://perma.cc/34QG-G6UR]. Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Czech Republic are also in the process of adopting SDM. See MDAC’s 
Recent Legal Capacity Advocacy Activities in Lithuania, Bulgaria and in Hungary, 
MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOC. CTR. (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.mdac.info/en/16/10/2012 
/MDAC_s_recent_legal_capacity_advocacy_activities_in_Lithuania_Bulgaria_and_in_Hu
ngary [https://perma.cc/N9X4-5FFT]. 
 47 Supported Decision-Making Agreement Act, TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357 (West 
2015). Legislators passed House Bill 39 and Senate Bill 1881 during the 84th Texas 
Legislative Session in 2015. Id. 
 48 Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake, supra note 24, at 138 (“We have not yet seen the full 
application of Article 12 in a judicial decision.”); see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 
504 (2008) (stating that international law commitments do not function as binding federal 
law); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353–54, 353 n.4 (2006) (holding that legal 
interpretations by international courts deserve “respectful consideration” but are not 
binding and do not necessarily have effect as federal law). But cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005) (acknowledging the relevance of the views of the international 
community and that “the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to 
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one state court judge has discussed SDM’s conceptual and practical import as 
an alternative to guardianship.49 In the case of In re Guardianship of Dameris 
L., Judge Kristin Booth Glen connected federal and state constitutional 
principles of substantive due process with international human rights—
specifically, the CRPD—in support of her decision to revoke guardianship of a 
twenty-nine-year old woman, Dameris, with an intellectual disability.50 Judge 
Glen reasoned that “where a person with an intellectual disability has the 
‘other resource’ of decision making support, that resource/network constitutes 
the least restrictive alternative, precluding the imposition of a legal 
guardian.”51  
In Dameris’s case, Judge Glen concluded that the evidence demonstrated 
that she had the mental and adaptive abilities to “exercise her legal capacity, to 
make and act on her own decisions, with the assistance of a support 
network.”52 Thus, the judge determined that “[t]erminating the letters of 
guardianship previously granted to [Dameris’s husband and mother] 
recognizes them, instead, as persons assisting and supporting her autonomy, 
not superseding it.”53  
Legal scholars have argued that the use of SDM models is not aspirational 
or benevolent; rather, current reliance on substituted decision-making vehicles 
(such as the very institution of legal guardianship) violates Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act’s integration mandate.54  
                                                                                                                     
international authorities as instructive”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) 
(citing the European Convention on Human Rights and decisions by the British Parliament 
and the European Court of Human Rights as indicative of prevailing norms). 
 49 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of D.D., 19 N.Y.S.3d 867, 871 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2015) 
(citing In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 856 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2012)) 
(stating that “supported decision making must be explored and exhausted before 
guardianship can be imposed”); see also Court Order, Ross v. Hatch, No. 
CWF120000426P-03 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2013); Theresa Vargas, Woman with Down 
Syndrome Prevails Over Parents in Guardianship Case, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/woman-with-down-syndrome-prevails-over-parents-in-
guardianship-case/2013/08/02/4aec4692-fae3-11e2-9bde-7ddaa186b751_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/J8B5-NFQQ] (describing a case in which a judge rejected a guardianship 
request from the parents of a woman with Down syndrome).  
 50 In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d at 855–56. 
 51 Id. at 856. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. Courts in other countries have used a similar rationale. See Stanev v. Bulgaria, 
2012-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 81, 147 (citing the CRPD and noting “the growing importance which 
international instruments for the protection of people with mental disorders are now 
attaching to granting them as much legal autonomy as possible”); Shtukaturov v. Russia, 
2008-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 353, 356–58 (finding that the legal incapacitation of petitioner, 
Shtukaturov, violated Article 6, the right to a fair trial, Article 8, the right to privacy, and, 
for the subsequent involuntary hospitalization, the right to liberty and to petition the court 
for relief). 
 54 Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness—A Legal and 
Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 314 (2011); Salzman, 
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B. Normative Implications of Supportive Decision-Making in U.S. Law 
SDM reflects a significant normative shift in the structure of Anglo-
American conceptions of legal rights and responsibilities, yet, in the spirit of 
legal realism, better reflects the everyday decision-making of people with and 
without disabilities. Although SDM more accurately reflects decisional 
agency, the current normative framework of legally recognized decisions is 
built around an individual decision-maker and the rights and responsibilities 
that attach to a particular decision. Thus, a shift in the normative framework 
requires a conversation about the implications of such a shift more broadly.  
I have explored the implications of SDM in court procedures and rules 
such as rules for discovery—e.g., interrogatories, admissions, and declarations. 
How should the law recognize responses produced with the assistance of 
another person? Furthermore, SDM would require evidentiary reforms to 
account for the decision-making model—e.g., evidentiary rules including 
burdens of proof and related presumptions, hearsay, character evidence, and 
conceptions of “unavailability.” The very presence of a supporter would 
challenge the four core testimonial qualities that define evidence law—
memory, perception, sincerity, and narration.55 
Beyond procedural and evidentiary rules, consider the “meeting of the 
minds” required for the valid formation of a contract. Contract law principles 
reflect a meeting of the minds of two individuals.56 How would the law 
account for the third party supporter in terms of the formation, execution, and 
enforceability of the contractual terms and obligations? Could the existence of 
a support network suffice for contract formation?57 A key question concerns 
                                                                                                                     
supra note 40, at 160; see Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 589 (1999) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)) (“The statute as a whole is intended ‘to provide a clear 
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities’”). 
 55 See FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee’s note (noting admissibility of materials 
“bearing upon the perception, memory, and narration of witnesses”).  
 56 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“An 
agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons.” 
(emphasis added)). Note that corporations are legal persons under the law and can enter 
into enforceable contracts. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005) 
(“[E]very corporation has . . . the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary 
or convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including without limitation power . . . to 
make contracts . . . .”). 
 57 See Terry Carney & Fleur Beaupert, Public and Private Bricolage—Challenges 
Balancing Law, Services and Civil Society in Advancing CRPD Supported Decision-
Making, 36 UNSW L.J. 175, 187–88 (2013) (discussing the potential contractual and 
fiduciary obligations that might arise in the context of a SDM agreement); Glen, supra note 
42, at 146–47 (exploring “representation agreements” and their use and enforceability by 
disabled and aging persons to manage routine affairs, including financial transactions, 
health care decisions, legal services, “and other areas of personal care”); Michael Wald & 
Eli D. Pierce, Elder Ethics: How Supported Decision-Making Could Protect Incapacitated 
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the existence of a non-cognitive-based account for will and preferences.58 
What would this look like and would it be acceptable? How would SDM work 
in the context of informed consent in health law or for participation in research 
studies?59 The answers are beyond the scope of this Response but worthy of 
exploration if we are committed to using SDM systems. 
III. APPLICABILITY OF COGNITION-PLUS TO PERSONS WITH 
INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 
Boni-Saenz applies his cognition-plus test to older adults with dementia 
and uses the case of former Iowa state representative, Henry Rayhons, to 
illustrate the mechanics of his test.60 He makes the claim that his test applies to 
people with persistent cognitive disabilities more broadly, which includes 
people with intellectual and developmental disabilities.61 There are certainly 
similarities and overlap between the effects of cognitive impairments on older 
adults and persons with intellectual disabilities.62 This Part, however, 
discusses the differences between individuals who currently lack cognitive 
abilities and those who have never had them, and how these differences 
challenge the broader applicability of cognition-plus. I do not suggest that 
cognition-plus is inapplicable to people with intellectual disabilities, but rather 
that Boni-Saenz may wish to account for these differences in either design or 
application of his proposed doctrinal test. 
                                                                                                                     
Seniors, 79 TEX. B.J. 104, 105 (2016) (discussing the use of SDM to aid seniors who are 
not considered incapacitated in making financial and other life decisions). 
 58 See Telephone Interview with Robert D. Dinerstein, Professor of Law and Dean for 
Experiential Learning, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law (Apr. 15, 2016).  
 59 See Sandra Berkowitz, Informed Consent, Research, and the Elderly, 18 
GERONTOLOGIST 237, 242 (1978) (noting the risks inherent in allowing third party 
decision-making in the gerontology context); Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, 
Proxy Decision Making for Incompetent Patients: An Ethical and Empirical Analysis, 267 
JAMA 2067, 2069 (1992) (discussing the “family rights” argument wherein “the family 
deserves recognition as an important social unit that ought to be treated . . . as a responsible 
decisionmaker in matters that ultimately affect its members”); Alan Meisel, Managed 
Care, Autonomy, and Decisionmaking at the End of Life, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1393, 1422 
(1999) (noting that family members are often involved in the medical decision-making 
process “under the aegis of the substituted judgment standard”). 
 60 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1247–53. 
 61 Id. at 1243–44 (distinguishing cognition-plus from existing sexual incapacity 
doctrines and emphasizing its benefits particularly with respect to individuals with 
persistent cognitive impairments). 
 62 People with intellectual disabilities are more susceptible to dementia later in life. 
Learning Disabilities and Dementia, ALZHEIMER’S SOC’Y 1, 
https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/documents_info.php?documentID=103 
[https://perma.cc/74U7-RK2K] (last updated Mar. 2015) (“People with learning 
disabilities, particularly those with Down’s syndrome, are at increased risk of developing 
dementia.”). 
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A. Volition  
Boni-Saenz establishes a threshold test of volition that focuses on whether 
the person with “persistent cognitive impairments still has the capacity to 
express volition.”63 The goal of this step is to establish whether the person can 
express will and preferences,64 not a factual determination of whether volition 
actually existed in the case before the court. He accounts for both verbal and 
non-verbal means of expressing volition, such as facial expressions, and the 
comorbid presentation of communication impairments and cognitive 
disabilities.65 If the individual is unable to express will and preferences, 
according to Boni-Saenz, he lacks the capacity to consent to sex, and liability 
would attach to his sexual partner.66 
People with intellectual or developmental disabilities may have a 
particularly difficult time getting past the threshold test when they 
communicate through non-normative methods. Consider a recent Ninth Circuit 
decision, United States v. James, in which the court reversed the trial judge’s 
decision to acquit after the jury returned a guilty verdict on federal charges of 
sexual abuse of a “severely disabled” woman.67 The statute prohibits sexual 
intercourse with a person the defendant knows is “physically incapable of 
declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that 
sexual act.”68  
Judge Tallman, writing for the majority, discusses the sufficiency of 
evidence supporting T.C.’s, the victim’s, inability to communicate volition 
under the statute: (1) “witnesses—even those who knew her well—could not 
always understand T.C.;” (2) “the evidence demonstrated [T.C. and the 
defendant] never spent any appreciable time together before [the defendant] 
sexually assaulted her. Nothing indicates he knew her well enough to 
understand her or could otherwise understand her attempts at communication;” 
(3) although she communicated through head nodding, biting, or other non-
verbal indicators, “the evidence demonstrated that [T.C.] had difficulty 
communicating even with her longtime caregivers, close family members, the 
emergency room nurse, and investigators;”69 (4) the defendant’s statement that 
T.C. “just lay there” during the alleged assault; and (5) that T.C. was unable to 
                                                                                                                     
 63 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1234. 
 64 Id. at 1235. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 United States v. James, 810 F.3d 674, 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2016). This case involved 
an alleged rape on the Fort Apache Indian Reservation. Id. at 677. The federal government, 
and not the state of Arizona, had jurisdiction to indict and try the defendant pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B). Id.  
 68 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).  
 69 For example, T.C. did not communicate with the treating nurse in the emergency 
room after the alleged attack. James, 810 F.3d at 682. 
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care for herself, “groom,” or walk independently.70 Judge Tallman concludes 
his opinion with an editorial statement somewhat removed from the legal 
question in this case yet apropos of his decision: “The law in its majesty 
protects from assault those who are too weak and feeble to protect themselves. 
No society worthy of being called civilized may do any less.”71 Judge Tallman 
saw T.C.’s disability, and its physical and behavioral manifestations, as 
evidence of her helplessness and vulnerability sufficient for a jury to convict 
the defendant. 
Judge Kozinski, the sole dissenter, draws attention to the statutory 
language that established the prosecutorial burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that T.C. was physically incapable of communicating her 
unwillingness to engage in sex.72 Judge Kozinski dismisses the majority’s 
evidence as irrelevant, nothing more than “a number of facts that are pretty 
much beside the point and . . . cannot overcome the solid wall of evidence that 
T.C. was capable of communicating her lack of consent when she was so 
inclined.”73 Furthermore, he notes that T.C.’s need for assistance with personal 
care was also irrelevant to the statutory inquiry.74 Judge Kozinski foretells of 
potentially disastrous effects of the majority’s holding to people with 
disabilities and atypical communication methods: 
The majority claims that its holding “does not preclude someone 
suffering from a physical disability from ever having consensual 
sexual intercourse.” I’m not so sure. James will go to prison, likely for 
many years, because he had sex with someone whose physical 
handicap impaired her ability to communicate, even though those who 
knew her testified that she could physically convey the idea of “no” 
when she wanted to. Today’s opinion will make others more reticent 
about engaging in sex with people who are physically impaired. Their 
already difficult task of seeking out a partner for sexual gratification 
will become even more daunting. 
 
. . . T.C. herself, for example, will never have sex again; who’d be 
foolish enough to risk it?75 
The James case supports skepticism that those with communication 
impairments will be able to overcome even the most basic threshold test for 
volition. Sadly, I suspect People v. Miranda, cited in Boni-Saenz’s article,76 is 
                                                                                                                     
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 683. 
 72 Id. at 684 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 73 Id. at 686.  
 74 Id. at 687. 
 75 James, 810 F.3d at 687 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 76 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1235 n.166. 
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more likely the exception, and United States v. James is more reflective of 
courts’ analyses of volition. 
B. Knowledge and Consequences 
A majority of courts employ some version of the “knowledge and 
consequences” test that asks whether the person has the cognitive capacity to 
reason about a specific sexual decision.77 Boni-Saenz advances a more 
nuanced vision of this test that accounts for the dangers of requiring 
knowledge of moral or social consequences of a sexual decision.78 He calls for 
a minimal understanding of the individual’s right to choose whether to consent 
or not.79 Surpassing this doctrinal hurdle requires an assessment of what 
people with intellectual disabilities know.80 This is a function of asking well-
formulated questions as well as deciding, as a baseline, what is important for 
them to know with respect to a particular decision.81  
People with intellectual and developmental disabilities present at least 
three unique challenges in meeting this test.82 First, as an evidentiary matter, 
this prong of the functional test often turns on an expert assessment of 
intelligence as a proxy for reasoning and knowledge. Most rape and sexual 
assault cases today, where the alleged victim is a person with an intellectual 
disability, rely on the testimony of a court-appointed or party-appointed 
forensic psychologist.83 The expert administers one of several IQ tests based 
on one or two interviews with the person with ID/DD to ultimately produce a 
composite, numerical reflection of intelligence.84 While IQ tests have an 
                                                                                                                     
 77 Id. at 1216–22. 
 78 Id. at 1234–53. 
 79 Id. at 1230–33. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See id. 
 82 I recognize the internal diversity within the population of people with intellectual 
and developmental disabilities, and use the aggregate terms to facilitate a discussion about 
persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, such as autism or cerebral palsy, 
who may share some degree of mental impairment related to their disabilities. 
 83 Dhanda, supra note 17, at 432 (“[J]udges arrive at decisions of incompetence 
relying upon medical experts opining as to the presence or absence of disability.”); see, 
e.g., Ely v. State, 384 S.E.2d 268, 268 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that court-ordered 
psychological evaluation by expert, which included IQ testing, was relevant in determining 
victim’s ability to consent); People v. Whitten, 647 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) 
(citing victim’s IQ score and mental health expert’s testimony in finding of victim’s 
inability to consent); People v. McMullen, 414 N.E.2d 214, 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) 
(considering testimony of psychologist that victim had IQ scores below the average range 
for finding of victim’s ability to consent); People v. Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (N.Y. 
1995) (using an IQ test to establish female victim’s moderate retardation in sexual assault 
case); People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1330–31 (N.Y. 1977) (considering school 
psychologist’s testimony and victim’s IQ scores to determine victim’s capacity to consent). 
 84 In 1905, French psychologist Alfred Binet and medical student Theodore Simon 
published the first Binet-Simon scale, a test meant to identify children with intellectual, 
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adaptive measure built in, they are focused primarily on measuring cognitive 
and adaptive deficits rather than strengths in those areas.85 The danger in 
moving to the functional test has been an overreliance on expert testimony and 
medical diagnostic evidence without assessing evidence of adaptive 
capabilities rather than deficits. Without more, the functional test becomes a 
status attribution model of legal capacity.  
Second, a history of exclusion from meaningful, inclusive public 
education and involuntary institutionalization has contributed to significant 
structural deficiencies in sex education. Even those public schools that require 
                                                                                                                     
mental, or psychosocial disabilities. Trisha Imhoff, Alfred Binet, MUSKINGUM C. (May 
2000), http://www.muskingum.edu/~psych/psycweb/history/binet.htm [https://perma.cc/WXA3-
LU93]. The scale’s purpose was to determine a child’s most appropriate educational 
setting. Jenifer P. Marom, Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale, ENCYCLOPEDIA MENTAL 
DISORDERS, http://www.minddisorders.com/Py-Z/Stanford-Binet-Intelligence-Scale.html 
[https://perma.cc/5MDA-5ZZQ]. The Binet-Simon test produced an identifiable numerical 
score and a conclusion regarding the mental age of the individual in comparison to her 
chronological age. Alfred Binet & TH. Simon, New Methods for the Diagnosis of the 
Intellectual Level of Subnormals, 12 L’ANNÉE PSYCHOLOGIQUE 191, 191–244 (1905), 
reprinted in THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN 37–90 (Elizabeth S. Kite 
trans., 1916). Today, IQ assessments include more than the Binet-Simon test—the 
Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale is the Binet-Simon test’s modern equivalent and is in its 
fifth iteration. Gale H. Roid, Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, HOUGHTON MIFFLIN 
HARCOURT (2003), http://www.hmhco.com/hmh-assessments/other-clinical-
assessments/stanford-binet [https://perma.cc/E63C-EVYD]. Today, there are a multitude of 
different intelligence tests—e.g., the Woodcock Johnson III test, Differential Ability Scales 
(DAS-II), the Universal Nonverbal Intelligence test, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children (WISC-V), etc. See Erica Patino, Types of Intelligence and Achievement Tests, 
UNDERSTOOD.ORG (June 5, 2014), https://www.understood.org/en/school-
learning/evaluations/types-of-tests/types-of-intelligence-and-achievement-tests 
[https://perma.cc/7F7F-7PW4]. 
 85 Definitions of ID/DD have evolved over time and, most recently, reflect the 
adaptive components of ID/DD that determine the extent of supports needed. This is the 
product of questions concerning the validity of IQ tests, particularly for those with atypical 
communication methods. See IQ Testing in Individuals with Intellectual Disability, U.C. 
DAVIS HEALTH SYS. (June 18, 2015), http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/welcome/features 
/2014-2015/06/20150618_IQ-testing-Hessl.html [https://perma.cc/66W9-24XN]. All 
standard IQ tests, for example, have a “floor,” or a level below which they are unable to 
measure cognitive functioning. Individuals with intellectual disabilities often “have a 
cumulative (or Full Scale) IQ that is below what the test can measure . . . . But a floored 
score doesn’t tell you anything about their true abilities.” Id.; see also Frequently Asked 
Questions on Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES (2013), https://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition/faqs-on-intellectual-
disability#.VxNGOkf3gco [https://perma.cc/M4AY-QQ9M] (defining intellectual 
disability as a function of both cognitive and adaptive measures that account for both 
strengths and limitations and urging evaluators to consider such criteria as “community 
environment typical of the individual’s peers and culture,” “linguistic diversity,” and 
“cultural differences in the way people communicate, move, and behav[e]”). 
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formal sex education86 do not provide a curriculum substantively tailored to 
meet the needs of people with intellectual disabilities.87 Furthermore, the 
dominant messages and policy concerns in sex education are based on 
managing the risks associated with sex and disability and preventing abuse 
rather than on portraying sex as a positive good.  
Effectively, the current doctrine of sexual incapacity creates a familiar 
catch-22 for disenfranchised populations: the test requires knowledge and 
appreciation of the consequences of sexual activity, yet it denies them 
meaningful educational and experiential opportunities to meet this standard.88 
The lives of people with ID/DD are highly regulated in return for economic 
support and personal assistance, particularly if they live in institutional settings 
such as nursing or group homes. In these settings, there is an absence of formal 
and informal opportunities to amass knowledge about sex and its biological 
consequences or to exercise sexual decision-making. Although older adults 
may experience a similar lack of privacy and dearth of private spaces, they are 
more likely to have experienced sexual decision-making prior to acquiring 
cognitive impairments, as was true, for example, in the Donna Rayhons case.89  
Third, and relatedly, the method of assessing knowledge and eliciting 
information from people with intellectual and developmental disabilities may 
require attention to the types of questions asked (e.g., leading questions may 
not produce accurate information because of a tendency to please) and asking 
                                                                                                                     
 86 As of March 1, 2016, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia require their 
public schools to teach sex education. State Policies on Sex Education in Schools, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-
policies-on-sex-education-in-schools.aspx [https://perma.cc/SL3V-54TM]. 
 87 Alison Boehning, Sex Education for Students with Disabilities, 1 L. & DISORDER 
59, 59, 65 (2006), https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/2022/203/Boehning 
%20sex%20education%20for%20students.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/3PAU-7UDF] 
(noting that sex education is controversial in general, and becomes even more so when the 
students in question have disabilities, and concluding that “sex education for America’s 
disabled students is lacking”).  
 88 Conceptually, this resembles the position of blacks during the Jim Crow era who 
were denied meaningful educational opportunities on the one hand and, on the other, were 
presented with literacy tests as threshold barriers to exercising the right to vote. I do not 
suggest that voting and sex are analogous, nor that the experience of people with ID/DD is 
the same as blacks during Reconstruction. Rather, I raise this comparison to highlight 
shared experiences of systematic denials of meaningful education constructing barriers to 
the exercise of rights. See Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: 
Jim Crow and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 92 
(2008) (noting that because “literacy tests could be passed by educated citizens of any 
color,” there was an incentive not to educate African-Americans—to do so “would be to 
risk that they would vote”). 
 89 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1202–03, 1247–53 (discussing the case of Donna Ray, 
a woman with Alzheimer’s disease, whose husband faced criminal charges for engaging in 
sexual relations with her while her mental capacity to consent was in question). 
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those questions in different ways over several sessions.90 This affects both the 
process of the forensic assessment as well as any interviews, depositions, or 
trial testimony elicited.  
C. Supported Decision-Making 
The practice of SDM in the context of people with ID/DD presents 
challenges distinct from its operation in the context of older adults with 
acquired impairments. As Boni-Saez notes, intellectual disability is an 
umbrella term with internal variances based on capacity to communicate 
(through words or conduct), physical mobility, severity of cognitive 
impairment, and education level, to name a few elements.91 The use of SDM 
as an alternative to forms of substituted decision-making, such as 
guardianship, does not neglect the existence of impairments and the need for 
support.92 Instead, the practice draws upon existing trusted networks of family, 
friends, and professionals already in the lives of people with disabilities.93  
Boni-Saenz’s novel third prong of the test for sexual incapacity assumes 
that a support network exists and that it is willing and capable of identifying, 
facilitating, and, if necessary, executing the decisional agency of the person 
with an intellectual disability.94 For example, consider a single mother whose 
son has cerebral palsy and cognitive impairments. The nineteen-year-old son 
receives special education services at school and significant support from his 
mother at home. Effectively non-verbal, he communicates through sounds and 
behaviors known to his mother and some teachers at his school and is learning 
to use an assistive communication device. On his eighteenth birthday, when 
the educational decision-making rights transfer from mother to son, the school 
district sends his mother a letter directing her to petition for guardianship in 
order to continue to be involved in her son’s education.95 Her legal 
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representative recommends that she consider SDM as a less restrictive 
alternative to guardianship. Does this young man have the legal capacity to 
consent to using SDM? Does he have a meaningful choice in identifying his 
supporter? Practically, his mother has been and will continue to be his 
supporter. How does she determine her son’s will and preferences? Given the 
level of support her son requires and his atypical communication, it is likely 
that his mother will continue to make decisions on his behalf in his best 
interests but with fewer records to show her decision-making role than if she 
had a court order appointing her as her son’s guardian. How might such a 
mother approach the issue of sexual decision-making and support on behalf of 
her son? Empirical studies indicate high risk aversion and conservatism about 
sexual expression shared by families and care workers of people with 
intellectual and developmental disabilities.96  
Take The Strange Case of Anna Stubblefield, as the New York Times 
headline read.97 New Jersey tried and convicted Anna Stubblefield, a Rutgers 
University professor, to twelve years in prison for sexually assaulting a thirty-
year-old man with severe physical and communication impairments, DJ, with 
whom she claims to have had a romantic relationship.98 DJ lived with his co-
guardians, his mother and brother.99 His brother was a former student of 
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Anna’s who approached her and requested her assistance in using assistive 
communication methods with DJ.100 Anna’s academic scholarship touched on 
“facilitated communication,” a method of physical support provided to the 
arm, hands, and fingers of a person with physical and communication 
impairments to assist them in the use of a type pad to express his or her 
thoughts.101 In the course of working with DJ, Anna claims that they fell in 
love and began a sexual relationship.102 After DJ and Anna approached his 
mother and brother to disclose their relationship, the family eventually accused 
Anna of rape and sexual assault, notified the police, and pursued 
prosecution.103 The State advanced a theory of the case that Anna was a sexual 
predator who took advantage of DJ, in part to advance her own career in 
disability advocacy.104 Its most persuasive evidence, according to the jury, was 
the presentation of DJ to the jury as demonstrative of his incapacity—the fact 
that his mother carried him into the courtroom (although prior photos of DJ 
suggest he uses a mechanical wheelchair), DJ’s proclivity to drool, and his 
inability to verbally communicate.105 In fact, because the judge determined 
that facilitated communication did not meet the rigorous evidentiary standards 
in Daubert for scientific evidence, the jury never had an opportunity to hear 
testimony or review documents about the use of facilitated communications 
between Anna and DJ.106 
In contrast, take the case of Henry and Donna Rayhons described by Boni-
Saenz in his article.107 Donna and Henry, a married couple, had a particular 
relationship with a past record of consent to sex, pleasurable interactions 
between them, knowledge of verbal and non-verbal communications, and no 
evidence of coercion or abuse.108 Henry regularly visited Donna in her nursing 
home and, according to Henry, Donna would indicate her desire to engage in 
sexual conduct by saying, “[s]hall we play a bit?”109 Boni-Saenz recognizes, 
“it is possible that [Donna] did not face a wide variety of relevant 
consequences because of her age, condition, and context, and she might thus 
satisfy” the knowledge and consequences prong of cognition-plus.110 Even if 
she did not meet the second prong of the test, Boni-Saenz contends that her 
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sexual decision-making supporter, Henry, although in a position of potential 
conflict, presented enough evidence to overcome a rebuttable presumption of 
inadequacy given their relationship, history, and absence of evidence of force 
or coercion.111 To the contrary, the evidence suggested that Donna did not 
want the nursing home staff to prevent her from sexual conduct with her 
husband.112 
Unlike older adults who may have a more developed record of preferences 
and past decision-making, people with intellectual disabilities, by definition, 
have lifelong cognitive impairments that, for the reasons discussed in the Part 
above, have not generated the types of experiences to develop will and 
preferences. Furthermore, the people most likely to be their supporters are 
parents or family members who may have particular risk-averse views about 
sex and disability, or religious or cultural views about the appropriateness of 
sexual activity. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Boni-Saenz’s use of SDM as a way to decrease the number of people 
found sexually incapacitated is a novel and exciting application of SDM. 
Domestically, practitioners are currently experimenting with SDM models in 
health care, education, and in the exercise of financial and parental rights 
through advanced directives and other contractual models. SDM presents 
opportunities for legal scholars across specialty areas—here elder law, 
disability rights law, and international human rights—to push existing 
normative boundaries and redefine legal capacity in our domestic laws. The 
cognition-plus test for legal incapacity opens the door for greater recognition 
of the decisional-agency of persons with cognitive disabilities; however, Boni-
Saenz continues to employ a functional approach to legal capacity that 
excludes some individuals from equal recognition before the law. There are 
also questions about how to define success and how to evaluate the 
implementation of SDM.113 This Response suggests a number of 
considerations for Boni-Saenz as he further develops his doctrinal test and 
seeks to apply it to people with intellectual and developmental disabilities.  
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